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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Department 
of Human Services, ex. rel. 
DIANA W. MOBLEY 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GEORGE C. MOBLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 930299-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 78-2a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10(1992), whereby the 
parties in a district court domestic relations case may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order regarding child 
support. Further, a judgment of criminal contempt is appealable 
as a matter of right. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167 
(Utah 1988). In this case, the final order was issued by the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules and constitutional 
provisions are contained in Addendum A: 
Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992) 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Did the court comply with the procedures mandated by 
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the treatment of 
the Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge submitted by the 
Defendant/Appellant? 
Standard of Review: No deference is accorded the trial 
court on questions of procedure. Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Was the Defendant/Appellant denied due process of law 
through the court's failure to ground the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in sufficient evidence, particularly the 
finding of ability to pay on the part of Defendant/Appellant and 
the finding of no just cause existing for failure to make child 
support payments. 
Standard of Review: Findings of fact shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a). However, finding should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
C. Was the Defendant/Appellant denied due process of law 
when the court found Defendant/Appellant in contempt of court and 
ordered him to jail, by failing to address the difference between 
direct and indirect contempt and failing to address the 
alternative of community service, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-32-12.1(5). 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of 
criminal contempt will be reversed for abuse of discretion. 
Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
D. Does the enforcement of the child support laws of the 
State of Utah using criminal contempt powers conflict with the 
13th Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 United 
States Code 1994 (1992)? 
Standard of Review: A question of law is reviewed for 
correctness, and accorded no particular deference. Carter v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 30, 1993, the Honorable John A. Rokich found the 
Defendant/Appellant in contempt and ordered his commitment to the 
Salt Lake County Jail for thirty days forthwith. The Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Contempt were signed April 
2, 1993. The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 29, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Following trial on July 19, 1989, a Decree of Divorce was 
entered on August 17, 1989, by the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Among other things, the Defendant was ordered to pay child 
support and alimony in twice-monthly payments, and $7,500.00 in 
past due temporary support. On December 13, 1989, the State of 
Utah filed an Ex Parte Motion for Joinder of Parties and on 
December 26, 1989, an Order for Joinder of Parties was signed by 
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the Honorable John A, Rokich, Judge, Third District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On November 27, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion for 
an Order to Show Cause in the above-captioned case, in which the 
State sought judgment for child support and alimony arrearages 
and an order holding the Defendant in contempt of court. On 
November 30, 1992, the court issued an Order to Show Cause. A 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on January 20, 1993, 
before Third District Court Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett. 
Defendant appeared pro se. The Commissioner recommended that the 
issue of contempt be certified for hearing before Judge Rokich. 
On March 30, 1993, a hearing on the Order to Show Cause was 
held before Judge Rokich. Defendant again appeared pro se. No 
witnesses were present. The State made a proffer of evidence and 
asked that the Defendant be found in contempt and be subject to 
the powers of the court. The Defendant responded by making a 
Motion to Continue based on an Affidavit for the Removal of a 
Judge filed March 29, 1993. The Motion to Continue was denied by 
the court (T. 3), as was the request to remove the judge for bias 
(T. 3). The court declined to follow the procedure for removal 
of a judge outlined in Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 63(b) was cited by the Defendant in his oral 
argument and in his affidavit. 
The court indicated that Defendant's memorandum, Written 
Arguments for Evidentuary Hearing March 30, 1993 (sic), had been 
read and found to be "meritless, absolutely meritless." (T. 4). 
The court found the Defendant in contempt of court and sentenced 
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him to jail for 30 days forthwith ("Put the handcuffs on him and 
take him over to jail.") (T.4). For the record the court found 
that the Defendant "failed to make payment; he has the ability to 
pay and has refused to acknowledge his obligation to provide for 
his family." (T. 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant argues that he timely filed an affidavit in 
support of a motion to recuse the judge, and that the judge 
failed to follow the clear mandate of Rule 63(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court then held an Order to 
Show Cause hearing on the issue of Defendant's non-payment of 
child support, and failed to make adequate findings of fact. The 
trial court found Defendant in criminal contempt of court and 
committed him forthwith to jail for thirty days, without 
affording the Defendant his constitutional rights. Finally, the 
trial court's criminal contempt order violated the Defendant's 
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURE MANDATED BY RULE 63(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S TIMELY REQUEST 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or 
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in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge 
shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of 
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency 
of the affidavit. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the 
case or determine the matter in question. No party 
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one 
affidavit: and no such affidavit shall be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that 
such affidavit and application are in good faith. 
Defendant first argues that his affidavit, filed March 29, 
1993, the day before the Order to Show Cause hearing scheduled 
for March 30, 1993, was timely filed. On November 30, 1992, the 
State filed an Order to Show Cause with the court, resuming the 
litigation of this case. The Return of Service was filed 
December 18, 1992, and a hearing was set before Commissioner 
Arnett on January 20, 1993. At the hearing on January 20, 1993, 
the Commissioner certified the issue of contempt for hearing 
before Judge Rokich. On February 1, 1993, Defendant filed a 
pleading titled Objection to District Court Commissioner's 
Recommendation, and on February 2, 1993, filed a pleading titled 
Notice to Submit for Decision, among others. A hearing on 
Defendant's Notice to Submit for Decision on his Objection to 
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District Court Commissioner's Recommendation was set for February 
26, 1993, and then continued by the court to March 30, 1993. 
On February 17, 1993, Defendant filed a Motion for Waiver of 
Payment of Fees and a Notice to Submit for Decision, which was 
scheduled for March 12, 1993, before Judge Rokich. Although the 
court struck the hearing as improperly before the court, the 
court did rule to deny the Defendant's motion for waiver of 
payment of fees. In his Affidavit for Removal of Judge the 
Defendant cites the events of the March 12 hearing as part of the 
basis for his Affidavit. Defendant filed his Affidavit 17 days 
later on March 29, 1993, prior to the hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause and before any evidence was taken or rulings were 
made. 
While Rule 63(b) imposes no specific time limitation on the 
filing of a motion for disqualification, in Madsen v. Prudential 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988), the court held that 
timeliness is essential. "To be timely, a motion to disqualify a 
judge should be filed at counsel's first opportunity after 
learning of the disqualifying facts." Madsen at 543. In Madsen 
the moving party waited 39 days after the disqualifying facts 
were made known and the trial court had ruled on the substantive 
issues before filing their motion. As the reviewing court 
pointed out, "[A] party who has a reasonable basis for moving to 
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first obtaining a 
favorable ruling and then complain only if the result is 
unfavorable. Madsen at 542. The court in Madsen indicated that 
the affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify should have 
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taken no more than ten days to prepare and file. In Birch v. 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), the trial judge, faced 
with a Rule 63(b) motion, reassigned the case to another judge 
who found the supporting affidavit to be legally insufficient and 
denied the motion. The reviewing court first considered 
timeliness. "As a prerequisite to considering the merits of 
Birch's claim, we must first determine whether his challenge was 
timely filed. Birch at 1116. Because Birch waited 88 days after 
the trial court had entered its judgment and after the facts 
alleged in the affidavit were known, the court found defendant's 
motion to be untimely and denied relief. 
In the present case, Defendant's first appearance before 
Judge Rokich in four years came on March 12, 1993. Both parties 
were reprimanded by the judge for scheduling the hearing and 
Defendant's Motion for Waiver of Payment of Fees was summarily 
denied. See Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge. Defendant 
recalled the summary fashion in which his divorce trial had been 
handled by the judge, and was concerned that he was not being 
accorded due process as a party or as a pro se litigant. 
Defendant, proceeding pro se, then filed his affidavit under Rule 
63(b) on March 29. Thus, Defendant filed his affidavit 17 days 
after the facts indicating bias became known to him. Although 
this is one week longer than the ten days cited in Madsen, the 
Madsen deadline was directed at counsel and presumes some 
familiarity with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Here the 
Defendant, proceeding pro se, was able to marshal facts, locate 
and cite the correct rule, and file the affidavit in a 
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comparatively reasonable time. Further, Defendant filed his 
affidavit prior to the pending hearing, and did not seek to 
disqualify the judge only after an unfavorable ruling had been 
made. See Madsen at 543. Finally, at no time did the State 
object to the timeliness of Defendant's Affidavit for the Removal 
of a Judge. The State, present at the hearing on March 30, 1993 
and author of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Contempt, waived any objection by their failure to object on 
the issue of timeliness. See generally State v. Schreuder, 726 
P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986). 
For relief, the Defendant's affidavit requested that the 
evidentiary hearing be continued. He again moved to continue the 
hearing orally on March 30, 1993, and asked the judge to take 
notice of his affidavit and to follow the procedures outlined in 
Rule 63(b). The court denied both requests. First, as to 
Defendant's motion to continue, the court stated, "That's 
denied". (T. 3). The court next denied Defendant's motion under 
Rule 63(b), stating that, "[T]here's no bias[.]" (T.3), and "I am 
not recusing myself in the case[.] I have no basis upon which to 
recuse myself." (T. 4). 
The trial court failed to comply with the procedures 
r 
mandated by Rule 63(b). In Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19 (Utah App. 1993), the reviewing court made clear that the 
trial court must comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 
63(b). "The clear import of Rule 63(b) is that a judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed must either recuse him- or 
herself, or if he or she questions the legal sufficiency of the 
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affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge for a ruling 
on its legal sufficiency." Barnard at 20. The trial court in 
the present case did neither, but rather ruled in its own favor 
on the issue of bias, which is error under Rule 63(b). 
POINT II: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACT 
At the evidentiary hearing on March 30, 1993, the Plaintiff 
proffered numerous facts in support of their allegation that the 
defendant was in contempt of court by his failure to pay child 
support. (T.2-3). When asked to respond, the Defendant made a 
motion to continue, essentially renewing the motion to continue 
contained in the Affidavit for Removal of Judge filed March 29, 
1993. The Court denied the motion. (T. 3). Defendant next 
brought the affidavit to the attention of the Court, and the 
Court denied the motion to recuse, saying there was no bias. The 
Court then found Defendant in contempt of court and had him 
immediately handcuffed and taken to jail. Prior to leaving the 
courtroom, the Defendant asked the Court to state findings and 
conclusions. The Court stated, "The findings are that he failed 
to make payment; he has the ability to pay and has refused to 
acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family." (T. 4). 
The Defendant replied, "I have not refused. Your honor, I have 
not— I do not have the ability to pay" (T. 5). He was then led 
away in chains. 
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The Plaintiff prepared a document titled Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order of Contempt, which was submitted to 
the Court for signature. The mailing certificate indicates that 
the document was mailed to the Defendant as his address of 
record, even though the Plaintiff had reason to know that the 
Defendant was incarcerated for 30 days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. The document submitted by the Plaintiff is replete with 
errors. The Court made no findings on the record with respect 
the findings of fact cited in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
Although the Plaintiff made a general proffer in open court as to 
those facts, no evidence in support of the proffer was introduced 
and the Court cited no evidence in support of its oral findings. 
The Defendant certainly did not stipulate to the proffer, and he 
was not permitted to cross-examine the evidentiary basis of the 
proffer. 
The Court also failed to address the evidence and argument 
presented by the Defendant. On March 29, 1993, the Defendant 
filed with the court a document titled Written Arguments for 
Evidentiary Hearing March 30, 1993 (sic). In the document the 
Defendant challenges the allegations against him, asserts 
defenses against the imposition of contempt, and provides 
documentary evidence of his income. The Court on the record 
fails to make findings as to any of the Defendant's contentions, 
either for or against. 
The general rule governing findings of facts is that they 
must be sufficiently detailed for the reviewing court to 
understand how the trial court applied the proper rule of law to 
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specific facts in reaching its conclusions of law. "The 
importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact 
in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end the findings 
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Rucker v. Dal ton,, 598 P. 2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). To challenge the trial court's factual 
findings the appellant must marshal the evidence. Where, 
however, as here, the trial court has failed to enter detailed 
findings, the appellant is excused from the marshaling effort. 
"There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the 
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot 
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other 
words, the way to attack findings which appear to be complete and 
which are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the supporting 
evidence and then demonstrate the evidence is inadequate to 
sustain such findings. But where the findings are not of that 
caliber, appellant need not go through a futile marshaling 
exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal 
insufficiency of the court's findings as framed." Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present case, the Court failed to articulate any 
subsidiary facts on the record in support of its findings. In 
Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P. 2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) the court 
enunciated the seven factors the trial court must consider in 
awarding prospective child support after a material change of 
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circumstances under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2) (1987). "Because 
these factors 'constitute material issues upon which the trial 
court must enter findings of fact,! (citation omitted), the 
failure to enter specific findings on each of the factors is 
generally reversible error... ." Ostler at 715. In the present 
case the Court addressed none of these factors in finding that 
the Defendant had the ability to pay, despite the Defendants 
objections. The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails 
to enter detailed findings concerning child support 
determination. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990). 
Again, in Woodward, a case involving the termination of parental 
rights, the court states, [U]nless the record "clearly and 
uncontrovertedly support[s]" the trial court's decision, the 
absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand 
for more detailed findings by the trial court. Id. at 478. 
POINT III: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
WHEN THE COURT FOUND DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND 
ORDERED HIM TO JAIL, BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTEMPT AND 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
In finding that Defendant was in contempt of court, the 
Court said, on the record, "[T]he findings are that he failed to 
make payment; he has the ability to pay and has refused to 
acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family." (T. 4). 
The Court ordered the Defendant to jail for thirty days 
forthwith. Apart from the question of whether the court's 
findings of fact were adequate to support the order of contempt, 
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two issues must be considered in order to determine if due 
process was accorded the Defendant. First, was the contempt 
direct or indirect, and second, was the contempt civil or 
criminal? 
The trial court's conclusions address the elements of 
contempt but fail to state specific facts in support thereof. 
"As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to 
comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited 
for contempt know what was required, had the ability to comply, 
and intentionally failed or refused to do so. Coleman v. 
Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1973). Again, the trial court 
failed to make adequate findings of fact, since the above-quoted 
basis for imposing contempt is a conclusion of law and there are 
no subsidiary facts in support thereof on the record. Apart from 
the Plaintiff's proffer and the Plaintiff's Findings of Facts, 
there is no evidence that the Defendant had the ability to comply 
or that the Defendant intentionally failed or refused to do so. 
The issue of whether contempt was direct or indirect is 
important because of the different procedural protections that 
must be afforded under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United State Constitution. See Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). Contempt is direct when 
it is committed in the presence of the judge, and is indirect 
when it is committed outside the presence of the judge. Direct 
contempt may be punished summarily under Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 
(1992). For indirect contempt to be found, however, the due 
process clause requires that, "the person charged be advised of 
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the nature of the action against him [or her], have assistance of 
counsel, if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and 
have the right to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf." 
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d at 1322. Since the Plaintiff was 
required to provide evidence to the Court to prove that the 
Defendant was in contempt, the contempt was clearly indirect. 
Given what occurred in the courtroom, however, the Defendant was 
not accorded due process. The Defendant was not afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, nor 
was he able to offer testimony on his own behalf. Finally, he 
was not given the assistance of counsel, nor was he advised of 
such a possibility, and by proceeding pro se he seems to have 
earned the enmity of the court. 
Similarly, the issue of whether the contempt is categorized 
as civil or criminal has due process consequences. Contempt is 
civil if it is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, 
and if the sentence, whether jail or a fine, is conditioned upon 
a definite performance by the defendant and may be purged by such 
performance. Contempt is criminal if it is punitive and intended 
to vindicate the authority of the court, and if the sentence is 
limited to imprisonment for a definite period. See Hicks ex rel. 
Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423
 (1988). "[W]e 
now, prospectively only, adopt the Feiock approach as a matter of 
state law. For all future cases, we will follow the rule that a 
contempt order is criminal if the fine or sentence imposed is 
fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the fine or imprisonment 
is conditional such that the contemner can obtain relief from the 
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contempt order merely by doing some act as ordered by the court. 
Further, a contempt order is civil if the order is to pay a fine 
to the other party rather than to the court." Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d at 1168, n.5. In the present case the contempt 
can only be characterized as criminal because the unconditional 
sentence was intended to be punishment, as the Defendant was 
ordered to jail forthwith for thirty days without any means to 
purge himself of the sentence by the court. 
A further consequence of criminal contempt is, "the 
fundamental proposition that criminal penalties may not be 
imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that 
the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings, including 
the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Feiock at 632. The Plaintiff in the present case has 
couched the findings of fact as 'clear and convincing evidence,f 
and thereby fails to meet the requisite burden of proof. The 
right to counsel attaches, and an indigent person charged with a 
criminal offense has a right to appointed counsel at public 
expense. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006 
(1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963); 
State v. Vincent, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah App. 1992). The 
Defendant was not given the assistance of counsel, did not waive 
assistance of counsel, and was not questioned as to indigency. 
The Defendant was incarcerated at the request of the State and by 
the order of the Court without the constitutional protections and 
fundamental fairness required by due process when he was sent to 
jail for thirty days without the assistance of counsel, without 
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the opportunity to confront witnesses, without the opportunity to 
testify on his own behalf, upon inadequate factual findings, and 
under an erroneously low burden of proof. 
POINT IV: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH USING CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWERS 
CONFLICTS WITH THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
Defendant, in his Written Arguments for Evidentuary Hearing 
March 30, 1993 (sic), raised the following defense to the 
imposition of contempt by the court. He asserts that the 
Plaintiff has alleged an artificially high imputed income for the 
Defendant, so that it appears that the Defendant has the 
financial means to pay his obligation to his children. Then, by 
failing to make payment, the logical inference is that the 
Defendant intentionally and willfully refuses to pay his 
obligation. Defendant contends the imputation of income creates 
an obligation of work, since if the Defendant does not work the 
court presumes willful refusal to pay. If the court enforces its 
order to pay through criminal contempt powers, the Defendant 
argues, the court violates the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
The enabling legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992), states: 
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The holding of any person to service or labor under the 
system known as peonage is abolished and forever 
prohibited in any Territory or State of the United 
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, 
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which 
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, 
or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be 
made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or 
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or 
labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any 
deft or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and 
void. 
The term 'peonage' has its origins in Mexico, where a 'peon' 
was a person who was compelled to work for his creditor until his 
debt was paid. Peonage is a system of involuntary servitude 
based upon indebtedness. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 
25 S.Ct. 429 (1905). Indebtedness of one person to another is a 
condition precedent to the existence of peonage, and the 
subsequent compulsion of service or work may be enforced through 
physical threats or law. For the purpose of determining whether 
a system of peonage existed, work compelled under state law by 
the constant threat and fear of imprisonment under such law 
rendered the work compulsory. United States v. Reynolds, 235 
U.S. 133, 35 S.Ct. 86 (1914). 
The Thirteenth Amendment clearly excepts from its ambit 
those individuals convicted of a crime. The case law is full of 
examples of courts denying relief to individuals who challenged 
their incarceration as involuntary servitude. Where a person is 
duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for a crime in 
accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude 
arises. Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963). See also 
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Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966)• However, 
imprisonment based upon a conviction where the defendant has not 
been afforded the fundamental right to assistance of counsel 
violates the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary 
servitude. U.S. v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1955). See also 
U. S. ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(incarceration upon conviction without evidence imposes 
involuntary servitude). 
Where the penalty for failure to perform services is other 
than incarceration or physical harm, the courts have held that 
the requirement of performance is not involuntary servitude. As 
an example, laws requiring attorneys to represent indigent 
defendants without compensation as a condition of practicing law 
have been held constitutional. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 
1211 (6th Cir. 1982). Compulsory state work programs for 
recipients of public assistance have been held constitutional, 
where the reduction of benefits, not incarceration, is the 
consequence of failure to participate. Brogan v. San Mateo 
County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Courts have considered whether the obligation to work to pay 
child support is a form of involuntary servitude under the 
thirteenth amendment. In Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554 (D.C. 
1979), the court ordered the husband to seek gainful employment 
commensurate with his abilities and educational background, and 
indicated that failure to pay child support could result in 
incarceration. Imposition of contempt was stayed upon adequate 
payments, however, so that the payment option operated as a purge 
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clause, rendering the contempt civil, not criminal. Likewise, in 
Re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859 (111. 1979), the contempt 
order was stayed and could be purged by payment of child support. 
In the present case the Defendant clearly had a lawful 
obligation to support his non-custodial children through payment 
of money. Further, the Court was free to fashion an order to 
compel the Defendant to pay that obligation, so long as the order 
did not involve incarceration. When the Court ordered the 
Defendant to jail unconditionally for non-payment of child 
support the Court violated the Defendant's Thirteenth Amendment 
rights. The Defendant was required by the Court to make payment 
or to work for money with which to make payment, and when the 
Defendant did not he was incarcerated. Further, as argued 
previously, Defendant was incarcerated without the assistance of 
counsel and without adequate evidence, which was held to be 
involuntary servitude in U.S. v. Morgan and U. S. ex rel. 
Caminito v. Murphy, above. The imposition of criminal contempt 
for non-payment of child support in this case violates the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Finally, Defendant draws the court's attention to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5), which states: 
If the court finds be a preponderance of the evidence 
that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has 
refused to pay child support as ordered by a court in 
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, the court may order the 
obligor to: 
(a) perform community service; and 
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or 
individual counseling to educate the obligor about the 
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importance of complying with the court order and 
providing the children with a regular and stable source 
of support. 
It appears the legislature has provided a remedy for non-payment 
of child support which is specifically included in the chapter as 
an alternative to contempt and which does not violate a 
defendant's thirteenth amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it failed to follow the procedure 
outlined in Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact. The trial 
court erred when it found the Defendant in criminal contempt and 
ordered him to jail without constitutional protections. The 
trial court violated the Defendant's Thirteenth Amendment rights 
under the U.S. Constitution when it committed him to jail 
unconditionally for non-payment of child support. 
Defendant requests the following relief from this court. 
Defendant asks that the case be remanded for reassignment to 
another judge consistent with Rule 63(b). Defendant asks that 
the case be remanded for further findings of fact pursuant to a 
hearing for modification of child support. Defendant asks that 
the court find that criminal contempt is an unlawful remedy for 
non-payment of child support. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / in day of September, 1993. I*
dant/Appe11ant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992): 
The holding of any person to service or labor under the 
system known as peonage is abolished and forever 
prohibited in any Territory or State of the United 
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, 
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which 
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, 
or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be 
made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or 
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or 
labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any 
deft or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and 
void. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or 
in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge 
shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of 
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency 
of the affidavit. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the 
case or determine the matter in question. No party 
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one 
affidavit: and no such affidavit shall be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that 
such affidavit and application are in good faith. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5): 
If the court finds be a preponderance of the evidence 
that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has 
refused to pay child support as ordered by a court in 
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, the court may order the 
obligor to: 
(a) perform community service; and 
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or 
individual counseling to educate the obligor about the 
importance of complying with the court order and 
providing the children with a regular and stable source 
of support. 
